

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PA-01 INR-10 SP-02 SS-15  
NSC-05 OPR-02 CA-01 OC-06 CCO-00 CIAE-00 /065 W  
-----069932 271459Z /72S

R 271202Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6945

INFO USICA WASHDC

DIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NDJAMENA 1647

USICA FOR AF

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS CD

SUBJECT: POLICY OPTION REGARDING POSSIBLE FROLINAT  
TAKEOVER

1. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS HAS BEEN WORKED UP BY THE PAO  
AND PROPOSED A POLICY OPTION CONCERNING FAST-MOVING EVENTS  
IN CHAD.

2. WE SHOULD NOW BE ASKING OURSELVES WHAT U.S. POLICY  
TOWARD AN EVENTUAL FROLINAT GOVERNMENT WOULD BE. THE  
ESCALATION OF THE FRENCH MILITAGX FORCE IS A GAMBLE: IT  
COULD BUY TIME FOR THE SMC AND ENABLE IT TO NEGOTIATE  
FROM A POSITION OF SOME STRENGTH ON JUNE 7 AND IN THE  
FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COULD ALSO LEAD TO WHAT  
FROLINAT HAS STUDIOUSLY REFRAINED FROM DOING THUS  
FAR--SHOWING THEIR STRENGTH IN NDJAMENA. IT CONTINUES  
ALSO TO CREATE ANTI-FRENCH FEELING. A SHAKY  
COALITION INVOLVING NORTHERNERS AND SOUTHERNERS IS  
STILL POSSIBLE, THOUGH FROLINAT RETAINS THE UPPER HAND  
AND SHOULD STILL CALL THE SHOTS. FRENCH MILITARY  
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PRESENCE IS ALSO OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO PROTECT FRENCH  
CIVILIANS IN EVENT OF A SHOWDOWN.

3. IT SHOULD BT NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH FROLINAT  
PROPAGANDA IS HEAVILY ANTI-FRENCH AND OCCASIONALLY  
QUOTE ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNQUOTE THERE HAS GENERALLY AND  
RECENTLY BEEN NO DIRECT ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

(AND NO REAL INTIMIDATION UNTIL THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE).  
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FROLINAT WILL TAR WITH A BROAD BRUSH  
AND AMERICANS COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ANTI-FRENCH  
RUBRIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS  
THAT FROLINAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ANTI-AMERICAN,  
WOULD NOT BE NEARLY AS CONTROLLED BY QADHAFI AS SOME  
THINK, AND, FRANKLY, IT JUST MIGHT NOT BE ALL THAT BAD.

4. WE SHOULD NOT OVERRACT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF  
AN EVENTUAL FROLINAT TAKEOVER BUT KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN.

5. A REBEL OR FROLINAT GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE ITS  
OWN PROBLEMS. ONE OF THE REASONS THAT THEY HAVE NOT  
DONE WELL EARLIER IS BECAUSE OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF  
THE VARIOUS REBEL GROUPS. THEY WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED  
TO COALESCE QUICKLY EVEN IF THEY DID CONTROL QAD.  
ANTI-QADHAFI FACTIONS COULD PLAY A PART IN MODERATING  
A NORTHERN-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT.

6. ADDITIONALLY, ANY NORTHERN-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT  
WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FROM THE SOUTH OF CHAD TO  
COME ANYWHERE NEAR RUNNING THE COUNTRY. THIS SUPPORT  
COULD WELL COME FROM THE NON-SARA SOUTHERN MAJORITY,  
BUT, IN ANY EVENT, THE NECESSITY TO HOLD THE VIABLE  
SOUTHERN PART OF CHAD SHOULD INCLINE ANY NORTHERN  
GOVERNMENT TOWARD MODERATION AND AWAY FROM  
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RADICALISM.

7. THE U.S. IS NOT IN A BAD POSITION. MILITARY AID HAS  
NEVER ARRIVED, THUS ANY SHOW OF OVERT MILITARY SUPPORT  
FOR THE PRESENT REGIME IS NOT EVIDENT. OUR AID PROGRAM IS  
NOT PARTICULARLY SUBSTANTIAL AND ICA ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN  
CAREFULLY APOLITICAL.

8. WE HAVE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE  
PRESENT GOVERNMENT, JUST AS THE OTHER TWELVE EMBASSIES  
DO IN NDJAMENA--WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH WHO  
HAVE DEEPLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE MALLOUM  
GOVERNMENT. (THEY MIGHT EVEN GET OFF EASY--FROLINAT  
PEOPLE ARE NOT FOOLS--THEY COULD WELL INSIST ON MERELY  
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRENCH MILITARY; AND FRENCH  
CIVILIANS, IF THEY DO NOT OVERREACT, COULD WELL  
CONTINUE TO EXIST AS BEFORE.)

9. IF FRENCH MILITARY MIGHT CREATES URBAN TERRORIST REACTION,  
IT IS POSSIBLE AMERICANS COULD BE ENDANGERED AND TAKEN  
FOR FRENCH. HOWEVER, IF FROLINAT PROPAGANDA FROM NOW  
ON REFRAINS FROM SINGLING OUT AMERICANS, WE SHOULD

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES.

10. REFRAIN FROM HIGH-PROFILE SUPPORT OF THE MALLOUM GOVERNMENT. MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE TOO LATE NOW ANYWAY AND COULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

11. CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CALLS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FOR CHAD AND A STOP TO BLOODSHED. SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT, IF POSSIBLE, BUT WE SHOULD NOT RUN IF IT MOVES INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PA-01 INR-10 SP-02 SS-15  
NSC-05 CIAE-00 OPR-02 CA-01 OC-06 CCO-00 /065 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6900  
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DIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NDJAMENA 1647

12. IN EVENT OF SERIOUS CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND NECESSITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL AMERICANS, RETAIN A SMALL EMBASSY AND ICA STAFF AND MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE READY TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH THE BEGIN UNDERSCORE DE FACTO END UNDERSCORE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD.

13. WHEN POSSIBLE, AND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL, INCREASE

EMBASSY TIES TO NORTHERNERS AND FROLINAT MODERATES.

14. ALTHOUGH FROLINAT IS COMMUNIST-SUPPORTED, IT  
BEGAN AS A LEGITIMATE NATIONALIST LIBERATION MOVEMENT.  
IT IS NOT COMPOSED OF WILD-EYED MARXIST REVOLUTIONARIES  
SPOUTING INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC. THEY HAVE SHOWN  
SOMEWHAT ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT THUS FAR--NDJAMENA COULD  
HAVE BEEN ANASTY PLACE LONG AGO--PREFERRING TO PAINT  
THEMSELVES AS A NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT INTERESTED IN  
BRINGING DOWN SARA DOMINATION. U.S. POLICY SHOULD BE  
CAREFUL NOT TO DRIVE THEM FURTHER INTO THE MARXIST  
CORNER.

15. THIS PRESUPPOSES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF U.S. INTEREST  
IN CHAD, AND CONOCO SHOULD PROVIDE PART OF IT. A MUSLIM  
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GOVERNMENT WOULD TIE CHAD CLOSER TO MIDEAST PROBLEMS  
WHILE KEEPING ITS AFRICAN CONNECTIONS. A MODERATE  
NORTHERN GOVERNMENT, SIMILAR TO THAT OF NIMEIRY,  
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND ITS ANCIENT  
TOUBOU DESIRES TO BE LEFT ALONG COULD SURFACE.

16. ALTHOUGH THE INFLUENCE OF QADHAFI ON A MUSLIM  
GOVERNMENT WOULD GROW, SO WOULD THAT OF SUDAN,  
EGYPT, AND SAUDI ARABAI, ALL MODERATE MIDEAST STATES.  
THE FIRST TWO HAVE A TERRITORIAL STAKE IN A MODERATE  
CHAD AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD, IF IT WANTED TO, INVEST  
IN CHAD JUST AS HEAVILY AS LIBYA COULD. DALSIMER

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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE  
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